No. 84-3040 Defendant\u27s Proposed Findings of Fact on Remedial Issues by United States District Court for the  District of Columbia
Hollins University 
Hollins Digital Commons 
Ann B. Hopkins Papers Manuscript Collections 
4-20-1990 
No. 84-3040 Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact on Remedial 
Issues 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
IN THE UNITEU STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 














Civil Action No. 84-3040 
(GAG) 
___________________ ) 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT ON REMEDIAL ISSUES 
1. Plaintiff is a management consultant who 
specializes in diagnosing and solving problems in the area of 
"big computer systems." 1990 Tr. at 35.1/ Plaintiff was 
employed in that capacity in Price Waterhouse's Office of 
Government Services ("OGS") in Washington, D.C., from August 
1978 to January 1984. Def. Ex. 4; 1990 Tr. at 31. 
2. Plaintiff was informed in late March 1983 that 
her candidacy for partnership in the Price Waterhouse firm 
would be deferred, or "held,• for one year. 1990 Tr. at 29. 
3. In April 1983, shortly after learning that her 
partnership candidacy had been placed on hold, plaintiff met 
with the Chairman and Senior Partner of Price Waterhouse, 
Joseph E. Connor, to discuss the reasons for the firm's 
decision to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy and her 
future prospects at the firm. 1985 Deposition of Joseph E. 
1/ The transcript of the February 28, 1990-March 1, 1990 trial 
on remand shall be cited herein as •1990 Tr.,• and the 
transcript of the March 1985 trial shall be cited at •1905 Tr." 
.. . ' 
Connor ("1985 Connor Dep.") at 38. In that conversation, 
Mr. Connor discussed with plaintiff her problems in dealing 
with subordinates and colleagues and, in particular, conveyed 
his disappointment that many of the most serious criticisms of 
plaintiff came from partners that he regarded highly, who were 
generally viewed as "balanced graders," and who "represented a 
formidable aggregation of partners whose standing with rest of 
the partners and with the Policy Board was very high." Id. 
at 57. Mr. Connor stressed the need for plaintiff to come to 
terms with and resolve her interpersonal deficiencies. He 
urged her to attempt to improve her method of working with 
others in the coming year, .id, at 58, and emphasized that the 
firm's decision to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy did 
not end her chances of becoming a partner, and, indeed, that 
"frequently a very high percentage of holds came in the next 
year."Z/ Id, at 54. 
4. A few days after her meeting with Mr. Connor, 
plaintiff discussed her conversation with Mr. Connor with an 
OGS partner in the Washington, D.C. office who had supported 
plaintiff's 1983 partnership candidacy. 1985 Tr. at 387. The 
record reflects that plaintiff materially misrepresented the 
substance of her conversation with Mr. Connor in this 
conversation, implying that Mr. Connor had disparaged those 
Z/ Eighty percent (16 out of 20) of the candidates held in 
1983 (plaintiff's year) were eventually admitted to the 
partnership. Def. Ex. 69. 
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partners who did not support plaintiff's partnership candidacy 
and that he had intimated that those who did not support 
plaintiff the next year would be risking damage to their 
relationship with him. See 1985 Tr. at 387-88, 410-11. 
5. This incident led the partner with whom plaintiff 
had this conversation to withdraw his support of plaintiff's 
1984 partnership candidacy.l/ The decision of this partner and 
another partner to oppose plaintiff's candidacy resulted in 
OGS's decision not to repropose plaintiff for partnership in 
1984. 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D.D.C. 1985). This decision 
was not tainted by any consideration of plaintiff's gender. 
618 F. Supp. at 1115. Plaintiff's own conduct, as described 
above, caused the OGS decision not to repropose her for 
partnership. 
6. On August 6, 1983, plaintiff was informed that 
OGS had decided not to repropose her for partnership in 1984. 
1990 Tr. at 29. 
7. After the August 1983 decision not to repropose 
plaintiff, she was informed that OGS would again consider 
proposing her for partnership the following year, Def. Ex. 48, 
and that she still had a "slim chance" to be made a partner. 
1985 Tr. at 112. She was also informed that she could continue 
l/ This partner testified to other difficulties that he 
encountered with plaintiff after the 1983 hold decision 
involving her inability to deal with colleagues in an 
acceptable fashion. 1985 Tr. at 388-89, 410. 
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at Price Waterhouse as a senior manager. Id. See~ 1990 
Tr. at 30. 
8. Plaintiff voluntarily submitted her resignation 
from Price Waterhouse in December 1983. 1990 Tr. at 31-32. 
Her resignation was accepted on January 17, 1984. I.d_. 
9. Plaintiff's contract with Price Waterhouse 
required plaintiff to give Price Waterhouse three months notice 
of her intent to resign and gave Price Waterhouse the right to 
accept plaintiff's resignation immediately and terminate the 
contract, provided it paid compensation to plaintiff for the 
duration of the three-month notice period. Def. Ex. 4; 1990 
Tr. at 32. Plaintiff actually was given a separation payment 
of $37,812.61, the equivalent of approximately five months pay, 
when the firm exercised its option to accept plaintiff's 
resignation in January 1984 and terminate the contract. 1990 
Tr. at 32; Def. Ex. 56. 
10. At the time of her resignation, plaintiff was 
earning $70,000 per year at Price Waterhouse. 1990 Tr. at 33. 
After the March 1983 hold decision, plaintiff had several 
employment options with other firms that would have paid 
$70,000- $90,000 a year. 1985 Tr. at 115. Plaintiff did not 
pursue these options then or after she resigned from Price 
Waterhouse. ~ 1990 Tr. at 34. 
11. Prior to her resignation, plaintiff made no 
effort to find a position at another accounting/consulting firm 
similar to the position she sought at Price Waterhouse. 1990 
Tr. at 33. 
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12. Plaintiff did not ask the Price Waterhouse firm 
for assistance in finding a new position. 1990 Tr. at 70. 
13. Prior to leaving Price Waterhouse, plaintiff 
determined to start her own consulting business and informed 
colleagues of that decision on the day of her departure. 1990 
Tr. at 33; id. at 15. She decided to "devote [her] time and 
energy to developing" her own management consulting business 
rather than seeking a partnership or similar position at 
another consulting firm . .I.d, at 15. 
14. Plaintiff viewed the so-called "Big Eight" 
accounting firms as the only organizations that could provide 
opportunities and compensation similar to the opportunities and 
compensation she had sought at Price Waterhouse. 1990 Tr. at 
38, 39; Pl. Pretrial Br. on Remedy at 12 (filed Jan. 17, 
1990). Yet she viewed pursuing opportunities at such firms as 
a "secondary set of activities• and made no effort to contact 
any other Big Eight firm except for Touche Ross. 1990 Tr. at 
48-49. Her "energy and ... time and ... focus was on [her] 
own practice.• J_g_. at 19. 
15. Plaintiff had been an employee at Touche Ross 
prior to her employment at Price Waterhouse. Plaintiff had 
been a well regarded management consultant at Touche Ross. 
1990 Tr. at 179. 
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16. William Beach, the Director of Touche Ross's 
management consulting practice from 1976 to 1987,~/ testified 
that in 1984 plaintiff contacted him regarding the availability 
of consulting positions at Touche Ross. 1990 Tr. at 179. Mr. 
Beach testified that, when plaintiff raised the subject of her 
returning to Touche Ross, he indicated that it was likely that 
she would be able to return to Touche Ross as a manager and 
that she would probably have been able to be on a "relatively 
fast [partnership] track." l_d. at 179-81. Plaintiff rejected 
this possibility and abruptly walked out of the meeting. Id. 
17. There was no reason why plaintiff could not have 
returned to Touche Ross as a manager and, had she performed 
satisfactorily, become a partner in a relatively short period 
of time. 1990 Tr. at 181. Plaintiff's failure to make partner 
at Price Waterhouse in 1983-84 would not have been a 
disqualifying factor in Touche Ross's consideration of 
plaintiff for a consulting position. Id. at 182. Nor would 
her age or the fact that plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against 
Price Waterhouse . .Id. at 182-83. 
18. Plaintiff did not formally apply for a management 
consulting position at any consulting or accounting firm. 1990 
Tr. at 48, 61-62. See also i_d. at 48. 
~/ In 1989 Touche Ross merged with another accounting firm, 
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells. Mr. Beach is now a principal in the 
new entity, Deloitte & Touche. 1990 Tr. at 175. 
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19. Plaintiff simply "was not interested" in a 
position at American Management Systems, Price Waterhouse's 
principal competitor for government services contracts relating 
to large computer systems. 1990 Tr. at 53-55. 
20. Plaintiff rejected the opportunity to start a 
consulting practice at the accounting firm of Aaronson, 
Fetridge, Weigle & Stern when she was approached in that regard 
in 1987. 1990 Tr. at 55-56. 
21. Plaintiff similarly declined Pinkerton Computer 
Consultants' offer of a management consulting position in 
1987. 1990 Tr. at 50. 
22. In 1988, because she could not "deal with the ups 
and downs of workload and cash flow" that an independent 
consulting practice entails, plaintiff became an employee of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
commonly known as the World Bank. 1990 Tr. at 25-26, 62. She 
presently holds the position of Senior Budget and Policy Review 
Officer at a gross salary of $92,500 a year. I.d. at 12. 
23. Neither plaintiff's independent consulting nor 
her work at the World Bank has involved the kind of significant 
or sustained large systems consulting that plaintiff had done 
at Price Waterhouse or Touche Ross. ~ 1990 Tr. at 17, 
247-48. Nor do they constitute positions comparable or 
"substantially equivalent" to a Price Waterhouse partnership. 
Plaintiff's independent consulting business was a new and 
speculative enterprise and provided limited opportunities to 
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take full advantage of her big systems expertise. 1990 Tr. at 
25-26, 334-36. Furthermore, plaintiff's budget officer 
position at the World Bank is different in kind than a 
partnership in a major private consulting or accounting firm, 
and does not provide similar responsibilities, opportunities or 
risks. Indeed, the World Bank compensates plaintiff on a 
schedule that is "very similar to the U.S. federal government's 
civil service pay system," based upon grade and step 
increases. 1990 Tr . at 136. 
24. Price Waterhouse introduced the testimony of 
Joseph E. Connor, who was Chairman and Senior Partner of Price 
Waterhouse U.S. Firm from 1978 to 1988 and presently serves as 
Chairman of Price Waterhouse World Firm. 1990 Tr. at 227. 
During the period plaintiff worked in the OGS office, Mr. 
Connor had oversight responsibility for that office. It was 
the only office whose partner-in-charge reported directly to 
Mr. Connor when he was Chairman of the firm. 1985 Connor Dep. 
at 5-6. Mr. Connor was personally involved in a major State 
Department project in which plaintiff also was involved and was 
therefore familiar with plaintiff's skills as a big systems 
management consultant. Id. at 23-27; ~ ~ 1990 Tr. at 
247. 
25. Mr. Connor participated in and agreed with the 
Policy Board's 1983 decision to defer plaintiff's partnership 
candidacy even though he was plaintiff's "most vociferous 
proponent" on the Policy Board. Id. 
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26. Based upon plaintiff's professional experience 
since she left Price Waterhouse, Mr. Connor does not believe 
that plaintiff could perform as a Price Waterhouse partner 
today. 1990 Tr. at 247. Based on plaintiff's description of 
her experience as an independent consultant and World Bank 
budget officer, plaintiff would not be in a position to handle 
the complexity and size of the firm's computer system 
projects. Id. at 247-48. 
27. Requiring admission of plaintiff as a partner 
would be disruptive and impractical because of plaintiff's 
deficiencies technically and in her ability to deal with 
colleagues and subordinates and because she would have been 
forced on the partnership despite conduct that provided "ample" 
justification for her failure to be advanced to partnership in 
1983. 1990 Tr. at 249-50; ~ 618 F. Supp. at 1114. 
28. Although plaintiff testified that she still would 
like to be made a Price Waterhouse partner, 1990 Tr. at 6-7, 
she has not demonstrated that such relief is practical or 
appropriate in this case. 
29. Plaintiff also has requested monetary relief in 
the form of back pay for the period July 1, 1983 through June 
30, 1989, and, as an alternative to admission as a partner, 
"front pay," including retirement benefits, for the period July 
1, 1989 "to her life expectancy in 2025." Pl. Ex. A3. Because 
Price Waterhouse has met its burden of demonstrating that 
plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages, 
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even if plaintiff had established liability, the Court would 
find that plaintiff's monetary recovery in this case must be 
much more limited in scope. 
30. Plaintiff could have remained as a senior manager 
at Price Waterhouse and received significantly higher 
compensation than she received from her consulting business or 
the World Bank. Approximately 19 Price Waterhouse senior 
managers presently earn in excess of $150,000 per year. 1990 
Tr. at 214. 
31. In 1984, there was a demand for management 
consultants in plaintiff's area of expertise at Big Eight 
accounting firms, large independent consulting firms and within 
divisions of companies. 1990 Tr. at 285. The national and 
Washington D.C. job markets for persons in the field of 
management consulting, including the large computer system 
specialty area of plaintiff, have grown dramatically since 
then . .Id. at 280-81. 
32. Consulting firms and companies place a premium on 
maturity, experience, project management ability, and business 
development skills; plaintiff's previous experience at Touche 
Ross and Price Waterhouse would have been a distinct advantage 
in her search for a new position. 1990 Tr. at 282; i..!;l. at 
288-89. 
33. Based upon the testimony of an expert in the 
employment opportunities available in plaintiff's field during 
the years 1983 and thereafter, in January 1984 plaintiff could 
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have found a ~omparable position at or above her Price 
Waterhouse salary of $70,000 in three to six months. 1990 
Tr. at 284. See~ .iJi. at 304-06, 331-32. 
34. In addition to Big Eight accounting firms, 
plaintiff could have sought employment at approximately "50 
very large consulting firms, most of whom have large systems 
consulting businesses." 1990 Tr. at 289. At least 30 of 
those firms have offices in the Washington, D.C. area. Id. 
There are many specialized systems consulting firms for whom 
plaintiff could have worked including large vendors of software 
and hardware . .l.d. 
35. Touche Ross expressed specific interest in 
plaintiff (1990 Tr. at 178-81) and other Big Eight firms such 
as Arthur Andersen and Peat Marwick & Mitchell as well as major 
management consulting firms like Booz Allen were looking for 
persons with plaintiff's , skills in 1984 . .Id. at 286. Such --, 
firms were paying $80,000 and up for experienced systems 
consultants; consulting practices were growing and industry was 
------- -
~ 
installing larger and more comPl_ex computers systems. Id~ at 
287. 
36. Plaintiff could have obtained such a position in 
1984 and, had she performed successfully, she would likely be 
making close to $200,000 today. 1990 Tr. at 287. 
37. Plaintiff's failure to make partner at Price 
Waterhouse would not significantly have hindered her efforts to 
find a comparable new position. 1990 Tr. at 287-88. It would 
\ 
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not have precluded executive recruiters from attempting to 
place plaintiff. _N. at 288. It is understood within the 
industry that partnership selection involves many factors and 
firms look at an individual's talents and circumstances and do 
not reject or discount an individual simply because an 
applicant did not become a partner at a Big Eight firm. Id. at 
287-88. 
38. The mere fact that plaintiff filed a lawsuit 
against Price Waterhouse would not have been a significant 
obstacle to plaintiff's efforts to find a satisfactory 
position. 1990 Tr. a t 288, 291. 
39. Plaintiff's age in 1984 would not have been a 
disadvantage in her efforts to seek employment comparable to 
the position she sought at Price Waterhouse. 1990 
Tr. at 288-89; id. at 309. 
40. There is great mobility in the accounting 
profession and senior staff are able to move from one firm to 
another with relative ease. ~Def.Ex. A7; 1990 Tr. at 224, 
320. A survey conducted by Price Waterhouse of its offices~/ 
in 1987 revealed that, during the period 1980-87, many Price 
Waterhouse employees (both male and female) whose partnership 
~/ Plaintiff mistakenly characterizes this as a "survey of all 
senior professionals who left its employ in the period 
1980 - 87." Pl. Proposed Findings 1 S(d). However, Price 
Waterhouse merely attempted to identify instances of employees 
who had left the firm and become partners of other firms. 1990 
Tr. at 207-08. The survey was not intended to be and was not 
represented to be comprehensive. 
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candidacies had not borne fruit, as well employees who were not 
even nominated for partnership, were able to leave Price 
Waterhouse and become partners at other Big Eight accounting 
firms. ~ Def. Ex. A7; 1990 Tr. at 183-85, 192-225. This 
evidence demonstrates that comparable positions were available 
for plaintiff. 
41. Plaintiff's efforts to find a suitable position 
with a major consulting firm were deficient. 1990 Tr. at 307. 
Plaintiff failed to seek to find a new position through 
executive search organizations. Id. The ordinary practice is 
to send lette rs and resumes to such organizations, which amass 
a data bank from which to search for individuals to fill 
positions for their 'clients . .Id. at 303-05; li. at 294-95. 
Plaintiff should have sent resumes and letters to 200 or more 
executive search firms if she was interested in positions 
nationwide (id. at 302, 307), and 50 to 60 if she was looking 
in Washington D.C. only . .Id. at 302. 
42. Plaintiff testified that she sent letters and 
resumes to no more than four executive recruiters. She was not 
able to produce documentation of any such contacts. 1990 
Tr. at '61. 
43. Had plaintiff been made a Price Waterhouse 
partner, she would have been subject to being transferred to a 
different city. Price Waterhouse partners ar~ regularly 
requested to transfer to a new office location, and are 
expected to do so. 1990 Tr. at 239-41. One-third of each new 
partnership class is required to transfer. Id. at 242 ·. 
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44. Although plaintiff stated that she was willing to 
relocate to another city after she left Price Waterhouse, 1990 
Tr. at 62-63, she did not interview with potential employers in 
any city outside of Washington, D.C. Id. at 62. 
45. Plaintiff's direct contact with potential 
employers was "wholly inadequate." 1990 Tr. at 307. A person 
in plaintiff's position should have started with a list of 30 
to 50 contacts and attempted to expand that network as her job 
search continued. Id. at 308. Plaintiff failed to take such 
steps. 
46. Plaintiff's failure to apply for a position at 
any of the major firms in her area of expertise cannot be 
viewed as a reasonable attempt to minimize her losses. 
47. The senior manager and partner compensation 
levels at other major accounting and consulting firms are and 
were comparable to compensation levels for similar positions at 
Price Waterhouse. ~ 1990 Tr. at 186, 194-95, 205, 268, 
285 - 87. 
48. Plaintiff's expert economist assumed that Price 
Waterhouse would have paid plaintiff more than double what any 
other firm or employer would pay. 1990 Tr. at 144-45; .i_d. at 
322-23. However, that assumption was not based upon any 
research or understanding of the availability of comparable 
positions for plaintiff once she left Price Waterhouse in 
1984. Id. at 144-45. It would be extremely rare for one firm 
to place a value on the services of an individual that so 
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greatly exceeds the individual's value in the marketplace. lQ. 
at 323. 
49. While plaintiff of course had the option to try 
another type of endeavor, she cannot reasonably expect Price 
Waterhouse to subsidize her for the differential resulting from 
the lower compensation to be expected as a sole proprietor or 
salaried employee in a civil service type position. The Court 
finds the assumption that plaintiff's self-employment income 
and her income from the World Bank was "the best she [could] 
do," 1990 Tr. at 144-45, to be unreasonable. ~ id. at 
322-23. Had plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence, she 
could have obtained a consulting position that offered 
opportunities and compensation comparable to a Price Waterhouse 
partnership by June 30, 1984. Thus, assuming Price Waterhouse 
is liable under Title VII, plaintiff's monetary recovery must 
be limited to the difference between the income of a beginning 
Price Waterhouse partner and the amount plaintiff actually 
earned for the period July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984. 
50. The appropriate interest rate to be applied to 
any award of back pay is 5.6\. 1990 Tr. at 341. 
51. As a matter of policy and equity, front pay 
should not be awarded for any period longer than the amount of 
time necessary for plaintiff to find employment at a comparable 
compensation level. Front pay should not be a sinecure. 
Moreover, providing plaintiff with lifetime partnership income 
would serve as a continuing disincentive to plaintiff to obtain 
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a position in the future that provides opportunities for 
advancement and compensation similar to a partnership at the 
Price Waterhouse firm. In addition, plaintiff testified that 
she believes she is presently qualified to perform as a partner 
at any other Big Eight firm, 1990 Tr. at 75, and if plaintiff 
did seek and obtain a position more lucrative than the one she 
now holds, she would be put in a better position than she would 
have enjoyed had she been made a partner in Price Waterhouse in 
1983. Such a result is directly antithetical to the remedial 
goals of Title VII. 
52. Even if plaintiff had taken reasonable steps to 
mitigate, the Court finds that her projections of front pay 
were highly speculative and too uncertain to permit an award of 
front pay in this case. 
53. In projecting the future profitability of Price 
Waterhouse, plaintiff's expert did not conduct any inquiry into 
the economic future of the accounting profession, 1990 Tr. at 
127-28, 150, although he acknowledged the •uncertainty about 
the accounting industry ... as a whole.• .Ig. at 128. 
However, the Court accepts Mr. Connor's testimony that changes 
in the profession in recent years have made the business 
environment extremely risky, unpredictable, and uncertain. Id. 
at 256-61. See also id. at 348-49. 
54. The Price Waterhouse partner share value has 
increased only about 5.4\ since 1984 (approximately 1\ a 
year). Plaintiff's expert's projection of a 34.8\ share value 
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increase in the first 5 years of the 1990's is unsupportable. 
I.d, at 164-66, 348-49. ~Def.Ex. Al8. 
55. Plaintiff's expert also assumed that, if 
plaintiff had made partner in 1983, she would have stayed with 
the firm for 21 years, until she retired at age 60 in 2004. 
Pl. Ex. A3. How~ver, he offered no explanation for this 
assumption, 1990 Tr. at 113-14, and admitted that this 
assumption was "not based on any specific information." I.d, at 
116; id. at 146-47. Plaintiff did not testify that she would 
have remained with Price Waterhouse for the duration of her 
career and the Court has no reason to believe that she would 
have done so. In fact, 10 of the 47 partners in plaintiff's 
class of 1983 have already left the firm. Id. at 215. 
Furthermore, the partner attrition rate at Price Waterhouse has 
increased steadily over the last decade . .IJl. 
56. Partner compensation is directly related to share 
allocation. 1990 Tr. at 237. Shares are allocated each year 
on the basis of the results of a yearly partner performance 
review process. If a partner is not performing to expected 
levels, shares will be allocated accordingly; if a partner has 
a serious technical, productivity or other problem, such as an 
"inability to relate to clients, to staff," shares may be 
reduced or the partner might be asked to leave the firm. 
Id. at 239. 
57. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that it 
is unreasonable to assume plaintiff would have remained with 
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the firm for 21 years and it would be highly speculative and 
improper to require Price Waterhouse to pay plaintiff "front 
pay" based on that assumption. 
58. Price Waterhouse presently has in effect two 
alternative retiring partner agreements; a "fixed income" 
agreement, Def. Ex. A3, and a "variable profit-sharing" 
agreement. Def. Ex. A2; see 1990 Tr. at 150. 
59. The retirement benefits under both agreements are 
unvested and unfunded. 1990 Tr. at 255-56. Thus, if a partner 
leaves the firm prior to age 55, that partner is entitled to no 
benefits. Id. at 256. In addition, if the firm becomes 
insolvent, no benefits are paid to retired partners . .I.d. 
Furthermore, the aggregate retirement benefits that can be paid 
in any one year are limited to 15\ of that year's profits. ~ 
Def. Ex. A2-A3. 
60. These elements add significant uncertainties to 
any calculation of retirement benefits, yet plaintiff's expert 
failed to take then into account in estimating such benefits. 
And retirement benefits account for more than 50\ of the 
undiscounted losses projected by plaintiff's expert. ~ 1990 
Tr. at 150-60. 
61. Plaintiff's front pay calculations assume she 
would have chosen the variable retirement benefits because, 
based upon plaintiff's projections, they would have been 
significantly more valuable than the fixed benefits. 1990 Tr. 
at 152. However, the projections of the variable benefits are 
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inherently more speculative, requiring predictions of the 
future profitability of Price Waterhouse until 2025, as opposed 
to 2004 using the fixed benefits alternative. Id. at 156. 
Furthermore, partners who choose the fixed benefits are 
afforded more freedom to continue working for other firms and 
companies once they leave Price Waterhouse than individuals who 
choose the variable benefits. Def. Ex. A2-A3; 1990 Tr. at 
153. The fixed benefits also afford greater certainty to the 
partner than the variable . .Id. at 246. And an increasing 
number of partners have in fact chosen fixed, rather than 
variable, benefits. Id. at 244-45. 
62. Plaintiff did not establish with sufficient 
certainty that she would have remained at Price Waterhouse 
until retirement at age 60 or what, if any, retirement benefits 
she would have received if she had made partner in 1983. 
63. In discounting plaintiff's projected future 
losses to present value, plaintiff's expert used a nontaxable 
interest rate of 5.8\. 1990 Tr. at 142. The Court finds that 
this 5.8\ discount rate is unjustifiably low and 
inappropriate. The current nontaxable interest rate is 7.2\ 
and it averaged over 9\ during the 1980's. Indeed, plaintiff's 
expert applied these much higher interest rates to adjust 
plaintiff's back pay award, but not to discount the projections 
of future losses. Id. at 149, 340-41. Moreover, given the 
substantial uncertainties in the accounting profession, the 
unlimited personal liability of partners and the difficulty of 
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obtaining insurance to cover the firm's potential liabilities 
(1990 Tr. at 245-46, 256-61), even these higher interest rates 
for risk free investments appear too low. No reasonable 
investor would purchase the right to the future income stream 
of a Price Waterhouse partner in light of these risks unless a 
substantially higher rate of interest was applied to the 
investment. See 1990 Tr. at 346-48. Plaintiff has failed to 
provide the Court with a reasonably certain discounted figure 
for future projections of partnership income. 
64. The plaintiff's front pay calculations do not 
allow the Court to determine with reasonable certainty the 
amount or present value of any future losses. 
65. Price Waterhouse has taken action to ensure that 
partnership decisions are made on a fair and equitable basis 
and in a nondiscriminatory atmosphere. 1990 Tr. at 254-55. 
Because the firm has itself already acted to cure any defective 
elements in its partner selection process, and because 
plaintiff has offered no evidence of the kind of historical, 
callous and intentional discrimination that justifies 
injunctive or affirmative relief, the Court finds that it is 
unnecessary to exercise any form of continuing supervision over 
the partnership. Moreover, the Court has declined to grant 
specific relief, such as partnership admission; therefore, 
plaintiff's request for an injunction regulating the firm in 
the future is moot. 
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